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CRIMINAL CODE

(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the
vehicle in whole or in part, it shall declare the vehicle to be forfeited and
direct it to be delivered for disposition in accordance with Subsection (7).
(j) When the court determines that the vehicle, in whole or in part, is
not subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the vehicle to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture in
part and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial
forfeiture. When the vehicle cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and
release, the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure,
storage of the vehicle, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture,
and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, in accordance with Subsection (7).
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture
proceeding, including seizure and storage of the vehicle, against the
individual or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture,
and may assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the
vehicle as appropriate.
(7) When any vehicle is forfeited under this section by a finding of the court
that no person is entitled to recover it or that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture
in part and release in part to a claimant, a court shall order that the vehicle be
delivered to the seizing agency for sale as the court directs. The court shall also
order that the proceeds from the sale of the vehicle be distributed in accordance
with the provisions of Subsection (6)(j).
(8) When the court orders that a vehicle be forfeited, in whole or in part,
under this section, it shall direct that the proceeds from the sale of the forfeited
vehicle, or part thereof, be divided or distributed as follows:
(a) % to tµ.e agency making the seizure; and
(b) ¼ to the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
(9) If the vehicle is found by the court not to be subject to forfeiture, it shall
be released to the owner.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-501, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 258, § 1.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 258, § 2
makes the act effective on March 21, 1994.
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PARTl
ATTEMPT
76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
• (a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed· had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-101, enacted by L.
1973,ch. 196, § 76-4-101.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
A conviction under§§ 76-4-101 and 76-6-202
for attempted burglary is not a conviction for an
offense which "otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical
mJury to another"
under
18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), providing for enhanced sentences, since attempted burglary convictions,
under Utah law, may include conduct well
outside Congress's target of "violent" felonies.
United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1992).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attempted burglary.
-Enhanced sentence.
Attempted murder.
Attempt to receive stolen property.
Campaign contributions.
Common-lawrule superseded.
Completedoffense.
Culpability.
Instructions.
Intent.
Overt act.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
Preclusion of the defense of impossibility by
this section does not violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v.
Sommers,569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
Attempted burglary.
-Enhanced sentence.
Congress did not intend implicitly to include
attempted burglary as a violent offense when it
specifiedburglary as a violent felony under 18
l).S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), providing for enhanced sentences in certain circumstances.
United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1992).
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Attempted murder.
The crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a crime requires
proof of an intent to consummate the crime.
Therefore, it follows that attempted felonymurder does not exist as a crime in Utah. State
v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989).
In order to convict defendant of attempted
first degree murder, the state had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (i) she had the intent to kill or knowledge
that her acts would result in death if carried
out; (ii) she engaged in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward causing the death of
her husband; and (iii) she did so either (a) by
administering or attempting to administer a
poison or lethal substance or a substance ad-
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ministered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity or (b) for pecuniary or other personal gain.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991).
Utah does not recognize the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide. State
v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).

same culpability and dishonesty as does the
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d
529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Attempt to receive stolen property.
Defendant who purchased property with the
belief that it was stolen could be convicted of
attempt to receive stolen property even though
the property was not stolen. State v. Sommers,
569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
Campaign contributions.
Under rare fact situation presented and in
view of state's stipulation that defendant had
no knowledge of prohibitory statute, it was not
established beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was guilty of attempt to make a
political contribution while employed as a liquor distillery representative. State v. Granato,
610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980).
Common-law rule superseded.
Former § 76-1-30 superseded common-law
rule that one could not be convicted of attempt
to commit crime which had in fact been completed. State v. Burks, 29 Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d
532 (1973).
Completed offense.
Where defendant, charged with rape of sixyear-old girl, was convicted of assault with
intent to commit rape, the greater charge included the lesser and court could instruct on
both; even though from evidence it might have
appeared rape was actually completed, jury
had power to convict defendant of lesser offense. State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 58 P. 1108
(1899).
A person may be convicted of an attempt to
commit a crime although he actually committed
the offense. State v. Garnick, 619 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1980).
Culpability.
Attempted crimes require only the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the completed offense; thus; there is no
difference between the intent required as an
element of the crime of attempted first degree
murder and that required for first degree murder itself. State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah
1982).
The crime of attempted forgery involves the

Instructions.
Trial court's failure to instruct that in order
to convict of attempted robbery the jury must
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's conduct constituted a "substantial step"
toward commission of the offense and that the
substantial step mtist be "strongly corroborative" of defendant's intent to commit the offense
was reversible error. State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d
291 (Utah 1986).
Intent.
Jury was justified in concluding that defendant's intent was to deprive owner of his property, in prosecution for attempt to steal a sheep,
in light of defendant's possession, dominion
over the sheep, lack of other explanation, and
stealth in appropriation of animal. State v.
Richards, 3 Utah 2d 368, 284 P.2d 691 (1955).
Conviction for attempted theft by receiving
two horses was upheld where defendant believed horses were stolen, even though horses
were not stolen but were being employed in
sting operation. State v. Powell, 672 P.2d 96
(Utah 1983).
Proof of the "knowing" mental state required
for depraved indifference homicide under § 765-203(1)(c) is not sufficient to satisfy the mental
state required by this section. State v. Vigil, 842
P.2d 843 (Utah 1992).
Overt act.
Where defendant in a prosecution for attempted breaking and entering and robbery
was arrested while riding in a car on his way to
commit the offense, it was determined that
defendant's behavior constituted more than
just an intention and conspiracy to commit the
offense, and that a substantial step toward
commission of the offense had taken place.
State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984).
Cited in State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295
(Utah 1986); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d
591 (Utah 1988); State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Harman, 767 P.2d
567 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. LeFevre, 825
P.2d 681 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Depaoli,
835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992); State v. Blaha, 851
P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Note, State v. Johnson and Multiple Factual Theories: A Practitioner's Guide to Interpreting Utah's "Patchwork
Verdict" Rules, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 907.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 158.
C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 114.
A.L.R. - Attempts to commit offenses of
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larceny by trick, confidence game, false pretenses, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 241.
Impossibility of consummation of substantive
crime as defense in criminal prosecution for
conspiracy or attempt to commit crime, 37
A.L.R.3d 375.

76-4-201

What constitutes attempted murder, 54
A.L.R.3d 612.
Changing of price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law cS:=>44.

76-4-102. Attempt - Classification

of offenses.

Criminal attempt to commit:
(1) a capital felony is a felony of the first degree;
(2) a felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree; except
that an attempt to commit child kidnaping, or to commit a violation of
Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4 of
Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of the first degree, is a felony of
the first degree;
(3) a felony of the second degree is a felony of the third degree;
(4) a felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor;
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor;
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor;
(7) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one
half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-102; 1983, ch. 88, § 10.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur. 2d.-21Am.
§ 158.

Jur. 2d Criminal Law

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law cS:=>1208(7).

PART2
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
76-4-201. Conspiracy

- Elements

of offense.

For purposes of this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more
persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and any one of
them commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the
offense is a capital offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or
robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission of conspiracy.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 8.
Cross-References. - Bus, conspiracy to

obstruct operation of, § 76-10-1510.
Conspiracy, pleading and proof, § 77-17-4.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agreement not to prosecute.
Evidence.
Indictment or information.
Liability for conspiracy.
Overt act.
Cited.

Agreement not to prosecute.
Agreement between public officials and vice
operators not to prosecute latter would have
violated Subsection (5) of former § 76-12-1,
defining criminal conspiracy. State v. Erwin,
101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).
Evidence.
Direct and positive evidence was not essential to prove conspiracy, but circumstantial evidence was sufficient where it excluded every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt,
which must have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; state could prove a case of conspiracy to commit extortion by and through a series
of acts and declarations showing a joint design
and common course of conduct to extort money
under color of offices held by defendants. State
v. McIntyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879 (1937).
Fact that defendant was found in hotel room
with another, both possessing loaded revolvers,
was insufficient evidence to prove crime of
conspiracy, independent of defendant's confession. State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d
353 (1957).
Indictment or information.
Information that sufficiently charged that
defendant and another conspired together to
cheat and defraud by any means that, if executed, would have amounted to cheating or
obtaining property by false pretenses stated

criminal conspiracy. State v. Blake, 36 Utah
605, 105 P. 910 (1909).
It was not necessary for indictment to allege
all of agreement; it was necessary for it to
allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense;
fact that proof showed more than was alleged
did not constitute variance or make it a conspiracy other than that charged in indictment, so
long as evidence proved facts alleged. State v.
Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).

Liability for conspiracy.
Where several combined together to commit
unlawful act, each was responsible for acts of
his associates or confederates committed in
furtherance thereof or in prosecution of common design for which they had combined. State
v. Kukis, 65 Utah 362, 237 P. 476 (1925); State
v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, 61 P. 527 (1900).
Overt act.
Under former requirement for act in addition
to agreement, overt act could, but need not
have been, the very crime that was the object of
the conspiracy; acts to effect the object of agreement need not have had tendency to effect such
object. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d
285 (1941).
The crime of conspiracy to commit insurance
fraud does not require an overt act of fraud
directly against the insurance company, such as
the filing of a claim, but may be evidenced by a
remote act, such as paying a third party to
commit arson, since the purpose of the "overt
act" requirement is to show that a conspiracy is
at work, and is not solely in the minds of the
conspirators. State v. Miller, 677 P.2d 1129
(Utah 1984).
Cited in Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746
P.2d 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - The Role of Joint
Endeavor in Establishing
Conspiratorial
Agreement, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 133.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy
§ 7.
C.J.S. - 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 36.
A.L.R. - Actionability of conspiracy to give
or to procure false testimony or other evidence,
31 A.L.R.3d 1423.
Impossibility of consummation of substantive
crime as defense in criminal prosecution for
conspiracy or attempt to commit crime, 37
A.L.R.3d 375.

Criminal liability of corporation for bribery
or conspiracy to bribe public official, 52
A.L.R.3d 1274.
Federal criminal liability of narcotics conspirator for different substantive crime of other
conspirator, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 661.
When is conspiracy continuing offense for
purposes of statute of limitations under 18
uses § 3282, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 616.
Key Numbers. - Conspiracy e:o 24.
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76-4-202.

Conspiracy - Classification

of offenses.

Conspiracy to commit:
(1) a capital felony is a felony of the first degree;
(2) a felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree; except
that conspiracy to commit child kidnaping, or to commit a violation of
Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4 of
Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of the first degree, is a felony of
the first degree;
(3) a felony of the second degree is a felony of the third degree;
(4) a felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor;
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor;
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor;
(7) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one
half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-202; 1983, ch. 88, § 11.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 180.

76-4-203. Criminal solicitation

<!=>422(1).

- Elements.

(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony be
committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes
another person to engage in specific conduct that under the circumstances as
the actor believes them to be would be a felony or would cause the other person
to be a party to the commission of a felony.
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation is
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that the
offense be committed.
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by the
actor:
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation;
(b) does not commit an overt act;
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
the commission of any offense;
(d) is not criminally responsible for the felony solicited;
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or convicted, or was convicted of
a different offense or of a different type or degree of offense; or
(f) is immune from prosecution.
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the actor:
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by definition is legally incapable of
committing the offense in an individual capacity; or
(b) fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit an
offense, if the intent of the actor's conduct was to effect the communication.
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an actor who otherwise solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense from being prosecuted and convicted as
97
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a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202 if the person solicited actually
commits the offense.
History: C. 1958, 76-4-203, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 189, § 1; 1993, ch. 230, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amend-

76-4-204.

Criminal solicitation

ment, effective May 3, 1993, added Subsection
(5).

- Penalties.

Criminal solicitation to commit:
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony;
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony;
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; and
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-204, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 189, § 2.

PARTS
EXEMPTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
76-4-301.

Specific attempt or conspiracy offense prevails.

Whenever any offense specifically designates or defines an attempt or
conspiracy and provides a penalty for the attempt or conspiracy other than
provided in this chapter, the specific offense shall prevail over the provisions of
this section [chapter].
History: C. 1958, 76-4-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-301.
Compiler's Notes. - The bracketed word

76-4-302.

"chapter" was inserted by the compiler to correct an apparent error.

Conviction of inchoate and principal offense or
attempt and conspiracy to commit offense prohibited.

No person shall be convicted of both an inchoate and principal offense or of
both an attempt to commit an offense and a conspiracy to commit the same
offense.
History: C. 1958, 76-4-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 9.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. J ur. 2d Criminal Law

§ 279.

C.J.S. 264.

Key Numbers. 199.

22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 245,
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